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1ABSTRACT 
 
Three decades after the Cambodian civil war, the leaders of the Khmer 
Rouge will finally be brought before an internationalized domestic tribunal.  
While the majority of those most responsible have died off or received immunity 
for their conduct, the Khmer Rouge Tribunal has the historic possibility of 
reaffirming the importance of international criminal justice and providing an 
historical narrative of the crimes committed and victims created.     
This commentary evaluates the importance of restoration in transitional 
justice and the importance victims and witnesses play in post-conflict justice.  
This article will argue that previous post-conflict remedies required a balance of 
restorative and retribution in order to effectuate transitional justice.  In turn, the 
incorporation and protection of witnesses and victims was vital to reconciliation. 
This article summarizes the importance of victims and witnesses in the 
context of Cambodia and describes mechanisms the Khmer Rouge Tribunal can 
use to enhance their participation and protection.  By expanding the Khmer Rouge 
Tribunal’s restorative role, it can bring provide post-conflict justice rather then 




Between April 17, 1975 and January 7, 1979, the Cambodian communist movement, the 
Khmer People's Revolutionary Party, ruled over Cambodia.1 Consistent with its policy of 
agrarian socialism, the Khmer Rouge deported peoples in massive numbers from urban areas into 
the countryside and was responsible for the deaths of over 1.5 million people, under the direction 
of Pol Pot, before the Khmer Rouge’s military defeat by the Vietnamese.2
Thirty years after the Pol Pot regime systematically slaughtered almost one third of 
Cambodia’s population, the majority of those responsible for the atrocities have yet to be tried.3
In 2004, following immense pressure by non-governmental organizations (NGOs)4, scholars, and 
 
1 For an account on how the Khmer Rouge rose to power see BEN KIERNAN, HOW POL POT CAME TO 
POWER: A HISTORY OF COMMUNISM IN KAMPUCHEA, 1930-1975 (1985). 
2 It is also estimated that around 250,000 ethnic and religious minorities were expelled from Cambodia in 
1975; id. at 107-09, 262-67. 
3 Id.
4 See Press release, 21 February 2002, Cambodian Human Rights Action Committee available at 
http://www.licadho.org/press/files/17FEBRUARY%2021%202002.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2006); Press release, 9 
December 2002, Cambodian Human Rights Action Committee, available at 
http://www.licadho.org/press/files/22DECEMBER%209%202002.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2006).  
2the international community, the Royal Government of Cambodia agreed with the United 
Nations to establish a tribunal to prosecute a select number of leaders responsible for the 
atrocities during the Khmer Rouge period.5 The Extraordinary Chambers, or Khmer Rouge 
Tribunal (KRT), was established as a hybrid court composed of both national and international 
prosecutors and judges.6
While the creation of the KRT is yet another hallmark in the burgeoning history of 
international criminal law, there are numerous and sincere questions about the KRT’s capacity to 
ensure justice in post-conflict Cambodia.  Where countries emerge from such destructive and 
violent conflicts, such as in Cambodia, past crimes need to be reconciled in order to build for a 
better future.  Victims of human rights abuses possess an undeniable right of reparation.7 More 
importantly, transitional justice necessitates the integration of victims and witnesses into the 
peace-making process.   
Although the Cambodian government, along with United Nations, agreed to create the 
KRT to prosecute senior Khmer Rouge officials, serious concerns have been raised about the 
reconciliatory role of the court.  This paper does not deal with the rights of witnesses and victims 
 
5 See generally Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia 
Concerning the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic 
Kampuchea [hereinafter Cambodia-UN Agreement], available at 
http://www.cambodia.gov.kh/krt/english/draft%20agreement.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2006) 
6 Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of 
Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea of 2004, available at 
http://www.cambodia.gov.kh/krt/pdfs/Combination%20of%20KR%20Law%20and%20the%20Amended%205%20
Oct%202004%20-%20Eng.pdf [hereinafter EC Law] (last visited Mar. 17, 2006). 
7 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 at 71 (1948), at art. 8 
(“Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the 
fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.”);  International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, at art. 2(3)(a) (“To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as 
herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy); International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination, Jan. 4, 1969, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, at art. 6 (“States Parties shall assure to everyone 
within their jurisdiction effective protection and remedies”); Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, June 26, 1987, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984), at art. 14 (“Each State Party 
shall ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act of torture obtains redress”); Convention Respecting the Laws 
and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV), Oct.18, 1907, at art.3 (“A belligerent party which violates the provisions 
of the said Regulations shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation”); Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, July 1, 2002, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3, [hereinafter Rome Statute] at arts. 68, 75.   
3per se. Clearly, the role of victims and witnesses changes in post-conflict settings, and whether 
the rights owed to victims and witnesses alters from normative settings is not a matter for this 
paper.  Rather, this paper deals less with rights than with theories of transitional justice and 
whether the KRT, using its existing structures, can achieve transitional justice in Cambodia.  To 
that extent, the participation and protection of victims and witnesses in the KRT is necessary 
because of the central importance they take in rehabilitation, reconciliation, and restoration.      
The first part of this paper will outline the contours of transitional justice by evaluating 
the importance of both restorative and retributive notions of justice.8 Because of the breadth and 
depth of crimes committed during conflict setting, post-conflict societies require a balance 
between mechanisms which punish criminal offenders and those which contribute to community 
healing and reconciliation.9 The failure to provide one over the other creates significant 
obstacles to transitioning societies in promoting peace and stability.  Thus, the first part 
concludes that both retribution and restoration models need to be incorporated into judicial 
systems when dealing with past crimes and abuses in post-conflict settings.10 
The second part of this paper looks at the failures of the ad hoc tribunals in Rwanda and 
Yugoslavia in emphasizing restorative notions of justice.11 Because of those failures, 
communities in Rwanda and former Yugoslav countries have been forced to look outside of 
international criminal tribunals and have created separate institutions that emphasize 
restoration.12 The second part concludes that the success, or failure, of restorative mechanisms 
depends fundamentally on the participation and protection of victims and witnesses.13 Thus, 
 
8 See infra, text accompanying notes 20-87.  
9 See infra, text accompanying notes 20-31. 
10 See infra, text accompanying notes 32-87. 
11 See infra, text accompanying notes 88-110. 
12 See infra, text accompanying notes 111-136. 
13 See infra, text accompanying notes 135-136. 
4institutions that promote victim and witness participation in combating past atrocities contribute 
greater to restorative objectives.  In part, these lessons have resulted in significant roles for 
victims within the International Criminal Court and newly formed hybrid tribunals.14 
The last part of this paper will evaluate the role of the KRT in promoting victim and 
witness protection and participation.  The KRT will only prosecute a limited number of Khmer 
Rouge leaders.15 Additionally, there are no alternative restorative mechanisms, as in Rwanda, 
South Africa, or Sierra Leone.16 Because public expectations and feeling of injustice is high in 
Cambodia, it is necessary that the KRT expand its restorative role.17 The third part will conclude 
that there are ample provisions within the KRT’s law that judges and prosecutors can draw from 
which would enhance the KRT’s reconciliatory role.18 Only by expanding this role can the KRT 
contribute to community building in Cambodia.     
 
I. TYPES OF JUSTICE IN POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES 
 
Following a period of political rule characterized by violence, oppression, and poverty, 
post conflict countries are often faced with serious economic, social, and political instability.19 
To address the multi-faceted problems confronting post-conflict societies, a number of remedial 
mechanisms, both domestically and internationally, have been utilized in the pursuit of justice.  
While not exhaustive, a list of judicial, or quasi-judicial, mechanisms implemented to address 
 
14 See infra, text accompanying notes 137-148. 
15 See infra, text accompanying notes 152-162. 
16 See infra, text accompanying notes 163-173. 
17 See infra, text accompanying notes 174-177. 
18 See infra, text accompanying notes 178-221. 
19 As noted by Bassiouni, “since 1945 there have been some 250 conflicts in almost every region of the 
world which have caused, at the low end, an estimated 70 million casualties, and at the high end, 170 million.”  M. 
CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 576 (2003).  
5widespread international crimes include the creation of international tribunals;20 the 
establishment of truth and reconciliation commissions;21 the exercise of jurisdiction by State 
courts on the basis of territoriality,22 personality,23 or universality24; and the establishment of 
 
20 U.N. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/Res. 827 (1993) (establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Former Yugoslavia); U.N. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 3453d mtg. (1994) (establishing the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda) 
21 A number of truth and reconciliation commissions have emerged in the past couple decades in post-
conflict societies in Argentina (Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas); Chile (Comisión Nacional 
de Verdad y Reconciliación); El Salvador (UComisión de la Verdad); Fiji (Reconciliation and Unity Commission); 
Guatelama (Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico); Peru (Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación);Sirra 
Leone (Truth and Reconciliation Commission); East Timor (Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação 
em Timor Leste); and the United States (Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission).  See United States 
Institute of Peace, Truth Commissions Digital Collection, available at http://www.usip.org/library/truth.html (last 
visited Mar. 6, 2006) 
22 Strassheim v. Daily, 1911, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911) (“Acts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to 
produce and producing detrimental effects within it, justify a state in punishing the cause of the harm as if he had 
been present at the effect, if the state should succeed in getting him within its power”) 
23 See People of Israel v. Eichmann, Supreme Court of Israel, Judgment of 29 May 1962 in ILR, Vol. 36, p. 
306.      
24 Article 23 of the Spanish 1985 Law on Judicial Power provides that Spanish courts have jurisdiction over 
crimes committed outside of Spain if they constitute crimes which Spain is obligated to prosecute under custom or 
international treaties, Sentence of the Constitutional Tribunal of Spain in the Guatemala Genocide Case, Second 
Chamber of the Constitutional Tribunal, Sep. 26, 2005, obtainable at 
http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/guatemala/doc/tcgtm1.html; Decision of the Audiencia Nacional (Sala de lo penal) 
of 13 December 2000 (genocide in Guatemala), available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl-nat.nsf (last visited Feb. 21, 
2006).  
Article 6 of the German Penal Code, which provides for universal jurisdiction over genocide, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes even when the crime has been committed abroad and has no link to Germany, 
Code of Crimes Against International Law, sec. 153f, available at 
http://www.bmj.bund.de/frames/eng/service/legislation_plans/10000582/index.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2006).  
Prior to legislative restrictions imposed by the Belgian legislature in 2003, the Law of 16 June 1993 
permitted Belgian courts to have jurisdiction over grave breaches to the 1949 Geneve Conventions no matter where 
the offences were committed or by whom. See Loi relative à la repression des violations graves de droit international 
humanitaire, Art. 3 §§ A-B (1999), published in Moniteur Belge, Mar. 23, 1999.  Belgium’s new law now requires 
either the presence of the defendant or that the victim either be Belgian or have resided in Belgium for at least three 
years when the alleged crimes took place.  5 August 2003 Act on Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian 
Law, Moniteur Belge, 7 Aug. 2003, pp. 40506 et. seq.   
The French, under the French Code de Procédure Pénale, requires passive personality in order to exercise 
extra-territorial jurisdiction.  CODE DE PROCEDURE PENALE [C. PR. PEN.] art. 689-1 [Penal Code] (1988) ("Any 
foreigner who, outside the territory of the Republic, commits a felony, either as perpetrator, or as accomplice, may 
be prosecuted and tried according to French law, when the victim of this felony is of French nationality.") translated 
in THE FRENCH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (Gerald L. Kock & Richard S. Frase trans., rev. ed.) (1988); see 
also Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention (France), Committee 
Against Torture, at 17-18, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/17/Add.18 (1997).  Austria, however, requires extradition to be 
impossible before exercising universal jurisdiction.  See A. Marschik, European National Approaches to War 
Crimes, in THE LAW OF WAR CRIMES, NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES 79, 79-81 (T. L. H. 
MCCORMACK & G. J. SIMPSON ed., 1997). 
For more cases and discussion on the application of universal jurisdiction se also Gabriel Bottini, Universal 
Jurisdiction After the Creation of the International Criminal Court, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 503 (2004); 
Bartram S. Brown, The Evolving Concept of Universal Jurisdiction, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 383, 321-92 (2001); 
6hybrid, or internationalized courts.25 The responses to atrocities can be loosely categorized into 
mechanisms of retributive and restorative justice.26 
Given the widespread nature of international crimes and the significant sectarian divides 
that characterize many post-conflict societies, both the notions of restoration and retribution are 
critical components to transitional justice.27 Retributive justice emphasizes the need for 
punishment and deterrence28 while restorative justice focuses on reconciliation, rehabilitation 
and the rebuilding of society.29 
However the two are not mutually exclusive, nor can be considered as competing 
alternatives.30 As the next two sections indicate, both retributive mechanisms are necessary but 
insufficient to individually result in transitional justice.  In many cases, States are left with a 
stark conflict between “peace” and “justice.”  The creation of institutions that solely focus on one 
or the other fall short in light of the benefits and problems each provide.  Thus, the process of 
 
Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s Hollow Foundation, 45 HARV. INT’L L. 
J. 183 (2004); Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEX. L. REV. 785 (1988); 
Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Pinochet Precedent and Universal Jurisdiction, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 311 (2001).  
25 See S.C. Res. 1315, P 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000); Law on the Establishment of the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of 
Democratic Kampuchea, Aug. 10, 2001, available at 
http://www.cambodia.gov.kh/krt/pdfs/KR%20Law%20as%20promulgated%20(Eng%20trans%206%20Sept%20200
1).pdf (English translation) (last visited Mar. 5, 2006); Agreement between the United Nations and the Government 
of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone P 1, U.N.-Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, 
available at http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl-agreement.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2006); S.C. Res. 1272, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1272 (Oct. 25, 1999) (creating the hybrid court in East Timor); Paul Bremer, III, Administrator, Coalition 
Provisional Authority, Iraq, Order No. 48, Delegation of Authority Regarding Establishment of an Iraqi Special 
Tribunal (Dec. 10, 2003), available at 
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20031210_CPAORD_48_IST_and_Appendix_A.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 
2006) (creating the internationalized Special Court in Iraq).     
26 See HOWARD ZEHR, CHANGING LENSES 63-82 (1990). 
27 See generally Jeremy Sarkin & Erin Daly, Too Many Questions, Too Few Answers: Reconciliation in 
Transitional Societies, 35 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 661 (2004).  
28 See David A. Crocker, Democracy and Punishment: Punishment, Reconciliation, and Democratic 
Deliberation, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. R. 509, 536 (2002) (“The deterrent effect of prosecution and punishment is 
weakened when people believe they can break the law and get away with it.”) 
29 See generally id (outlining the general theories and philosophies relating to retributive justice) 
30 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Combating Impunity for International Crimes, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 409, 409 
(2000) (stating “policies and practices of accommodation in the pursuit of political settlement conflict with legal 
accountability in the pursuit of retributive and restorative justice”); see also RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
51-59 (2002); ANDREAS O'SHEA, AMNESTY FOR CRIME IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE (2002).  
7reconciliation requires retribution and retribution can not stand without reconciliation.  Peaceful 
and just transition in Cambodia necessitates that the ideals of retribution and restoration are 
balanced in the prosecution of leaders before the Khmer Rouge Tribunal.31 
a. Retributive Justice 
 
The idea of retributive justice (or lex talionis) stems from the theoretical view that social 
equality, or fairness, can only be achieved through punishment.32 The notion of “punishment” 
incorporates certain historical practices implemented to address acts that constitute “crimes.”33 
Subsequently, our notions of “retribution” and justice are derived from historical acts intended to 
restore social equality.34 From a practical point of view, retribution is important in order to 
prevent people from escaping punishment (impunity)35 and also to act as a deterrent for future 
crimes.36 By determining individual responsibility and punishing individuals, retributive 
mechanisms prevent guilt from being assigned to a collective group of people in society.37 Thus, 
it can assist in the process of rebuilding society by preventing further social division and 
alienation.   
 
31 For a general understanding of principles of transitional justice, including a more specific explanation of 
retributive and restorative forms of justice see Miriam J. Aukerman, Extraordinary Evil, Ordinary Crime: A 
Framework for Understanding Transitional Justice, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 39 (2002). 
32 See Jennifer J. Llewellyn & Robert Howse, Institutions for Restorative Justice: The South African Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission, 49 UNIV. OF TORONTO L.J. 355, 376 (1999). 
33 See generally Frederick Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals II, in ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS 
AND ECCE HOMO 8 (W. Kaufman ed., W. Kaufmann & R.J. Hollingdale trans., 1967). 
34See J. LLEWELLYN & R. HOWSE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 39 (1998). 
35 See generally IGOR PRIMORATZ, JUSTIFYING LEGAL PUNISHMENT (1989). 
36 See BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 20, at 696-97 (“Rather, [retribution] can 
produce utilitarian results and achieve humanistic goals, such as deterrence and rehabilitation”); Crocker, supra note 
29, at 536. 
37 See Lode Walgrave, Restoration in Youth Justice, 31CRIME & JUST. 543, 558 (2004) (“In retributive 
justice, this [moral balance of rights and wrongs] is achieved by imposing suffering on the offender that is 
commensurate to the social harm he caused by his crime”). 
8In part, retribution is instinctively attractive.38 Communities expect law-breakers to be 
punished for their crimes.  Similarly, the international community expects that perpetrators of 
atrocities will face judgment and punishment.  Conversely, there is a sense of injustice when 
persons who perpetrate crimes are not punished.39 For example, it is thought that injustice 
occurs when a person receives immunity after committing harm.40 This is not to say that 
retribution and revenge are synonymous.41 Retribution is the unbiased act of punishing criminal 
conduct, rather then the emotional act of inflicting pain for personalized attacks like insults or 
 
38 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 237-38 (1976) (“The instinct for retribution is part of the nature of 
man”).  In part, the instinctive attractiveness of retributive justice can be traced back to the integration of religious 
law into communities.  A number of passages, at least in popular Western religions, contain elements of retribution 
for criminal conduct.  For example, the Old Testament describes that God stated, “‘Whoever sheds the blood of 
man, by man shall his blood be shed, for God made man in His own image.’” Genesis 9:6; Similar elements are 
continued in the New Testament and Islamic Law, both of which prescribe specific punishments for criminal 
conduct. John 19:11 (King James) (Jesus’ recognition that God has given man the power to punish ); Sura al-
Baqarah, 2:178-179, Sura al-Ma’ida, 5:45, Sura al-Nisa, 4:92 (outlining Qu’ranic prescriptions for penalty and 
victim rights.) See also TAHIR MAHMOOD ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW IN ISLAM AND THE MUSLIM WORLD: A
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1996); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Qesas Crimes, in ISLAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
203 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1982).  A number of scholars have also posited that from a biological perspective 
retributive emotions are more basic and easy to understand whereas the concept of reconciliation or restoration is 
much more rationalist. DANIEL VAN NESS & KAREN STRONG, RESTORING JUSTICE 27-28 (1997).  
39 See IMMANUEL KANT, THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE (1797) (theorizing that the failure to punish is an 
injustice to society and is the essence of the social contract.)   
40 The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which is highly regarded as a “restorative 
mechanism” similarly does not completely disregard the need for retribution.  In justifying the license of impunity, 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu, whom chairs the TRC, argues that the granting of amnesty does not forego retributive 
justice.  Rather, the perpetrators punishment is that he must “admit responsibility for the act for which amnesty is 
being sought” and that the perpetrator must face the “full glare of publicity.”  Desmond Tutu, ‘Chairperson's 
Foreward’ in Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, presented to President Nelson Mandela on Oct. 
29, 1998 at vol. 1, 8.  
41 This argument has been thoroughly rejected by retributive theorists.  See generally ROBERT NOZICK,
PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 366 (1981) (“retribution is done for a wrong, while revenge may be done for an 
injury or slight and need not be done for a wrong.”)  Crocker, supra note 29, at 517 (“Retribution provides both a 
sword to punish wrongdoers and a shield to protect them from more punishment than they deserve.  In contrast to 
punishment, revenge is wild, ‘insatiable,’ and unlimited.  After killing his victims, an agent of revenge may mutilate 
them and incinerate their houses.”);  Dan Markel, The Justice of Amnesty? Towards a Theory of Retributivism in 
Recovering States, 49 UNIV. OF TORONTO L.J. 389, 419-20 (1999) (noting the five primary differences between 
retribution and revenge). 
9taunts.42 Unlike revenge, retribution seeks to not simply punish, but punish justly with punitive 
limitations.43 Retribution is about “just deserts” and not simply “deserts.”   
Traditional national criminal trials, at least in North America and Europe, tend to 
emphasize the retributive aspect of justice.  Criminal trials are mechanisms for punishing the 
perpetrator for committing a wrong rather then for restoring peace between communities.44 
Similarly, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, following the Second World War, were constructed 
for the explicit purpose of punishing criminal offenders rather then creating reconciliation 
between the warring powers or their communities.45 
Given the complex and widespread violence that characterize States in conflict, there are 
numerous shortcomings that accompany the sole use of retributive mechanisms.  First, if the 
punishment is to be equal to the crime, then no punishment can ever address the gravity of 
widespread, mass atrocities like genocide, terrorism, or crimes against humanity.46 For example, 
would exercising the death penalty on Adolf Hitler, Saddam Hussein, or Slobodan Milosevic 
really be proportional to their participation in the killing of millions of people?  If justice is based 
on the equity of the punishment, then no punishment can be equitable to the severity of the 
 
42 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 230-31 (M. Oakeshott ed., 1975) (“From the definition of punishment, I 
infer, first, that neither private revenges, nor injuries of private men, can properly be styled punishment; because 
they proceed not from public authority”). 
43 IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 194-204 (W. Hastie trans., 1974) (1887) (punishment is not 
arbitrary but equitable to the nature of the crime); NOZICK, supra note 42, at 366. 
44 See DESMOND TUTU, NO FUTURE WITHOUT FORGIVENESS 54 (1999) (“the ‘chief goal’ of ‘retributive 
justice’ is ‘to be punitive’”).  
45 See id. at 19; DAVID LUBAN, THE LEGACIES OF NUREMBERG IN LEGAL MODERNISM 335-37 (1994); 
ARYEH NEIER, WAR CRIMES: BRUTALITY, GENOCIDE, TERROR, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 15-18 (1998). 
46 See Aukerman, supra note 32, at 39 (“true retributive justice is almost always unachievable in the wake 
of radical evil…it is often impossible even in prosecutions to impose a punishment that is proportional to the 
crime”); MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND 
MASS VIOLENCE 121 (1998) (“[massive human rights atrocities] call for more severe responses than would any 
ordinary criminal conduct, even the murder of an individual . . .And yet, there is no punishment that could express 
the proper scale of outrage”).  
10 
 
crimes committed by these persons.  Subsequently, justice can never be served when viewed 
from a purely retributive position.47 
Second, the sheer numbers of those persons who generally participate in widespread 
atrocities means that only the top leaders or only the low-level officers, but not all persons 
responsible, can be prosecuted and punished.48 Transitional societies lack the institutional 
capacity to punish all responsible persons.49 Post-conflict societies often suffer from insufficient 
judicial resources to confront both ordinary crimes, which rise during transitional periods,50 as 
well as the number of acts committing during the conflict.51 Therefore, a society that only values 
retribution for transition, can never effectively achieve justice in post-conflict states.52 
Lastly, retributive mechanisms can potentially create greater rifts between communities.  
If only members of one ethnic, religious, or national group are prosecuted for committing 
offenses, the perpetrator will be perceived as the victim and thus justify further actions against 
the other community.  For example, prosecution of all Hutus responsible for the Rwandan 
 
47 DONALD SHRIVER, AN ETHIC FOR ENEMIES: FORGIVENESS IN POLITICS 82 (1995) (“Justice falls limp 
before monster-sized evil”). 
48 See Prosecutor v. Delalic et al, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Decision, Feb. 20, 2001, ¶ 602 (Appeals Chamber, 
ICTY) (“In the present context, indeed in many criminal justice systems, the entity responsible for prosecutions has 
finite financial and human resources and cannot realistically be expected to prosecute every offender which may fall 
within the strict terms of its jurisdiction. It must of necessity make decisions as to the nature of the crimes and the 
offenders to be prosecuted.”); Aukerman, supra note 32, at 61-62 (“Such selective, limited prosecutions--the  only 
kind possible in transitional justice--fail to meet the basic requirements of retributive justice.”)  Aukerman also notes 
“Selective prosecution further undermines retributive goals because prosecutors rarely succeed in targeting only the 
most culpable.” 
49 See Impact of Armed Conflict on Children, Report of the Expert of the Secretary-General, Ms. Graca 
Machel, U.N. Doc. A/51/306, P116 (1996) (“Following the conflict in Rwanda, for example, only 20 percent of the 
judiciary survived, and the courts lacked the most basic resources”); Laura A. Dickinson, Transitional Justice in 
Afghanistan: The Promise of Mixed Tribunals, 31 Denv. J. INT'L L. & POL’Y 23, 36-37 (2002) (“In post-conflict 
situations, the need to develop local capacity in the justice sector is often an urgent problem. Kosovo and East Timor 
provide extreme examples. In both cases, the conflict virtually eliminated the physical infrastructure of the judiciary; 
court buildings, prisons, and equipment  [*37]  were destroyed”). 
50 See Charles Villa-Vicencio, Why Perpetrations Should Not Always Be Punished: Where the International 
Criminal Court and Truth Commissions Meet, 49 EMORY L.J. 205, 214 (2000) (“The escalation of crime in countries 
moving away from repressive rule indeed tends to undermine the democratic attempts to resolve past conflicts to 
which some within opposing political camps may be ready to recommit themselves”). 
51 Id.
52 See Aukerman, supra note 32, at 61; Carlos S. Nino, The Duty to Punish Past Abuses of Human Rights 
Put into Context: The Case of Argentina, 100 YALE L.J. 2619, 2620 (1991). 
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genocide could do more to strengthen differences between the two ethnic groups, rather then 
reconcile them.53 Similarly, many Germans viewed the Nuremburg trials as “victors’ justice” for 
failure to prosecute British officials responsible for atrocities in Germany.54 Thus, greater 
prosecution in post-conflict societies can do more to inhibit peaceful transition than to further it.  
 
b. Restorative Justice 
 
Restorative justice is equally important because it emphasizes the reconstruction and 
rehabilitation of a divided society and it involves perpetrators meeting their victims.55 
Restorative theorists view the criminal justice system as a community-building process.56 Rather 
then viewing criminal justice as a conflict between the state and the perpetrator, restorativists 
view criminal justice as a conflict between the perpetrator, victim and the community.57 
Subsequently, retributive justice emphasizes community building, rehabilitation, restitution, and 
reintegration rather then punishment.58 
53 See Jose E. Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 365, 
466 (1999) (“At present, criminal processes in Arusha and within Rwanda are likely to generate radically different 
reactions along ethnic lines.  For many Hutus, both international and national criminal processes appear skewed 
against them since the ICTR's temporal limits mean that its indictments and trials will focus on offenses committed 
by Hutus and ignore most violence committed by Tutsis, while Rwanda’s present courts are more likely to be unfair 
to Hutu defendants and less likely to pursue charges against Tutsi offenders”). 
54 LYAL S. SUNGA, INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS 
VIOLATIONS 19 (1992) 
55 See generally RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (Burt Galaway & Joe Hudson eds., 
1996); Daniel Van Ness & Pat Nolan, Legislation for Restorative Justice, 10 REGENT U.L. REV. 53, 66 (1998) 
(detailing principles of restorative justice);  John Braithwaite, A Future Where Punishment Is Marginalized: 
Realistic or Utopian?, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1727, 1743-44 (1999) (“Restorative justice is a process of bringing 
together the individuals who have been affected by an offense and having them agree on how to repair the harm 
caused by the crime”).    
56 See Elizabeth Latif, Note, Apologetic Justice: Evaluating Apologies Tailored Toward Legal Solutions, 81 
B.U.L. REV. 289, 292-94 (2001) 
57 RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 2 (Burt Galaway & Joe Hudson eds., 1996) 
58 See Adriaan Lanni, The Future of Community Justice, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 359, 375 (2005) 
(“Restorative justice is a reform movement that emphasizes restitution and rehabilitation over punishment and 
mandates that all those affected by the crime”); John Braithwaite, A Future Where Punishment Is Marginalized: 
Realistic or Utopian?, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1727, 1743 (1999) (“Restorative justice is a process of bringing together 
the individuals who have been affected by an offense and having them agree on how to repair the harm caused by 
the crime.”); Ellen A. Waldman, Healing Hearts or Righting Wrongs?: A Meditation on the Goals of “Restorative 
Justice”, 25 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 355, 359 (2004) (“Rather, restorativists are primarily concerned with 
meeting victim needs, which they understand to include redress and repair, rather than revenge and retaliation.”) 
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The argument for restorative justice is greater emphasized in post-conflict societies.  
Civil conflicts are usually the result of internal domestic ethnic, religious, or national divisions, 
which erupt into military confrontations, massacres, or even genocide.  They can involve 
thousands to millions of victims and perpetrators.  Restorative justice therefore aims to consider 
the impact justice can have on the future of a society and its social classes.59 
In order to create convergences in divided societies, retributive mechanisms generally 
give prominent roles to victims and the community in addition to the defendant.60 These 
mechanisms include mediations, conferencing groups, truth and reconciliation commissions,61 
and other programs that integrate victims and perpetrators.62 The most notable restorative 
mechanism is the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).63 The South 
African TRC was created to determine what happened during South Africa’s apartheid period, 
rather then punish guilty individuals.64 Thus, the TRC provided victims, witnesses, and the 
 
59 TUTU, supra note 45, at 54-55. 
60 In its 1998 report, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission found that restorative justice 
“seeks to redefine crime: it shifts the primary focus of crime from the breaking of laws or offences against a faceless 
state to a perception of crime as violations against human beings ... [and] encourages victims, offenders and the 
community to be directly involved in resolving conflicts.”  1 South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 
Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, ch. 5, 82 at 126 (1998)  
61 See generally PRISCILLA HAYNOR, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: THE PLACE FOR TRUTH COMMISSIONS IN A 
CHANGING WORLD (2000). 
62 See MARK S. UMBREIT, VICTIM MEETS OFFENDER: THE IMPACT OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND 
MEDIATION 2 (1994) 
63 The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, No. 34 of 1995, available at 
http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/legal/act9534.htm [hereinafter Amnesty Act] (last visited Mar. 2, 2006); See also 
RICHARD WILSON, THE POLITICS OF TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA: LEGITIMIZING THE POST-
APARTHEID STATE (2001); JILLIAN EDELSTEIN, TRUTH & LIES: STORIES FROM THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION 
COMMISSION IN SOUTH AFRICA (2002); KADER ASMAL ET AL., RECONCILIATION THROUGH TRUTH: A RECKONING 
OF APARTHEID'S CRIMINAL GOVERNANCE (1996).  Shortly after the TRC was established, the constitutionality of the 
amnesty provisions were challeneged in the Constitution Court and were unanimously upheld.  Azanian People's 
Organisation (AZAPO) & Others v. The President of the Republic of South Africa & Others, 17 CC 96 (S. Afr). 
64 Archbishop Desmond Tutu noted that the South African TRC was based on the theory of retributive 
justice which has historical roots in African culture: “Retributive justice - in which an impersonal state hands down 
punishment with little consideration for victims and hardly any for the perpetrator - is not the only form of justice.  I 
contend that there is another kind of justice, restorative justice, which was characteristic of traditional African 
jurisprudence.  Here the central concern is not retribution or punishment but, in the spirit of ubuntu, the healing of 
breaches, the redressing of imbalances, the restoration of broken relationships.  This kind of justice seeks to 
rehabilitate both the victim and the perpetrator, who should be given the opportunity to be reintegrated into the 
community he or she has injured.”  TUTU, supra note 45, at 54-55. 
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perpetrator the opportunity to tell their stories in return for amnesty and immunity from criminal 
prosecution.65 In part, the TRC was a political compromise.66 Rather than risking a further 
racial divide in South Africa, the TRC promoted participation by perpetrators.  On the other 
hand, to prevent perpetrators from receiving complete impunity for their acts, the TRC required 
that the crimes were politically motivated and the person seeking amnesty told the entire and 
whole truth.67 
In transitional societies, employing restorative mechanisms, as evidenced in South 
Africa, is crucial because there are a large number of victims and perpetrators.68 In the context 
of prolonged widespread conflict, it is impossible for all victims and witnesses to be heard and 
for all offenders to be prosecuted in war and genocide tribunals.69 It is then very likely that 
victims and their perpetrators will be living in close proximity and must learn to live with deep-
seated animosity and the painful memories of the past.  Thus, restorative mechanisms shift the 
perspective of justice by encouraging truth telling instead of punishment, vengeance, or 
revenge.70 
In a number of cases, restorative mechanisms have been utilized to encourage despotic 
leaders to transfer authority to emerging democratic efforts by granting amnesty from 
 
65 See Amnesty Act, supra note 63, at art. 20 (listing the conditions for amnesty). 
66 See Alex Boraine, Truth And Reconciliation in South Africa, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE: THE MORALITY OF 
TRUTH COMMISSIONS, 141, 143 (Robert I. Rotberg & Dennis Thompson eds., 2000) (the outcome in South Africa 
was “a negotiated settlement, a political compromise,” and it was “the only one possible in the conditions of 
transition in 1994.”); Suzanne Daley, Official Urges New Amnesty to Erase Scar of Apartheid, N.Y.TIMES, Feb. 26, 
1999, at A10. 
67 See Amnesty Act, supra note 63, at art. 20 (listing the conditions for amnesty). 
68 See Villa-Vicencio, supra note 51, at 209 (“Nation-building clearly requires the voice of victims and 
survivors to be heard”). 
69 See infra, text accompanying notes 89-93. 
70 See Villa-Vicencio, supra note 51, at 215 (“Retributive justice affirms the place of lex talionis (“an eye 
for an eye and a tooth for a tooth”) as an alternative to unbridled revenge”); TUTU, supra note 45, at 58 (“the 
solution arrived at was not perfect but it was the best that could be had in the circumstances - the truth in exchange 
for the freedom of the perpetrators”). 
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prosecution.71 Subsequently, immunity from prosecution is granted in order to avoid the 
continuation of “massive bloodshed” by bargaining for the removal of dictatorships.72 In 
Argentina, President Saul Menem pardoned all officers and leaders responsible for human rights 
abuses committed by the preceding military juntas in fear of a military coup.73 The Chilean 
government, under Augusto Pinochet, passed self-amnesty laws before giving power to the 
civilian government.74 Military dictator Idi Amin also conceded power only by receiving 
amnesty from Uganda.75 Lastly, Haitian General Raoul Cedras was given amnesty in exchange 
for passing over political and military authority to Haiti’s new democratic government.76 
Moreover, amnesty and immunity are granted in order to address emerging geopolitical 
realities.  For example, the Allies granted impunity to Turkish officials from being prosecuted for 
the killing of Armenians during World War I, in order to create an alliance against the Soviet 
Union.77 Similarly, Saddam Hussein was offered amnesty by the United States, prior to the start 
of the 2003 Iraqi war, in exchange for abdication of power, partially in order to avoid the 
destruction of thousands of lives and homes.78 
71 In order to negotiate peaceful transition and prevent the possibility of a coup, newly formed governments 
in Uganda, Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile agreed to grant amnesties to predecessor governments, including grave 
violations of human rights.   
72 President Bill Clinton, Remarks at White House Press Conference (Sept. 19, 1994), in The Crisis in 
Haiti, U.S. Department of State, Sept. 19, 1994 (justifying the amnesty deal with the Haitian government on the 
basis that it avoid “massive bloodshed and perhaps an extended period of occupation that could have been troubling 
to our country and to the world.”)  
73 See generally CARLOS S. NINO, RADICAL EVIL ON TRIAL (1996) 
74 On Aug. 8, 2000, Chile’s highest court stripped Pinochet of his immunity and ordered him to stand trial 
for murder.  See Clifford Krauss, Chile’s Effort to Try Pinochet Is Running Out of Steam, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 
2001, at A3. 
75 See Bernard Levin, Darkness and Devils, THE TIMES, Sept. 8, 1995. 
76 See generally Michael P. Scharf, Swapping Amnesty for Peace? Was There a Duty to Prosecute 
International Crimes in Haiti?, 31 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1 (1996) 
77 Bassiouni, Combating Impunity, supra note 31, at 414; see Treaty of Peace with Turkey, signed at 
Lausanne, July 24, 1923, 28 L.N.T.S. 11. 
78 See Remarks of President in Address to the Nation, March 17, 2003 (on file with author); M. Cherif 
Bassiouni, Post-war Justice, Justifying War, CHI. TRIB, Mar. 17, 2003, at p. 1.  
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From a theoretical standpoint, restorative mechanisms run contrary to obligations every 
nation has to prosecute or extradite (aut dedere, aut judicare) perpetrators of grave human rights 
violations.79 There is a general rule in international law prohibiting specific crimes which have 
acquired the nature of peremptory norms (jus cogens) from receiving impunity.80 Jus cogens 
crimes create legal interests within all states (obligations erga omnes)81 and prevents states from 
using legislative fiat or political compromises to avoid fulfillment of such obligations.82 The 
realizations of obligations are weakened every time a state utilizes immunities and amnesties to 
shield perpetrators from accountability.83 While amnesties can deliver the short-term benefit of 
 
79 See generally M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & EDWARD M. WISE, AUT DEDERE AUT JUDICARE: THE 
OBLIGATION TO EXTRADITE OR PROSECUTE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1995); Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: 
The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2599 (1991) (“The duty to 
punish human rights crimes imposed by customary law can readily accommodate the constraints faced by 
transitional societies.”); Naomi Roht-Arriaza, State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute Grave Human 
Rights Violations in International Law, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 451 (1990) (“Therefore, both policy and legal arguments 
support the conclusion that while a state may permissibly pass amnesties for some offenses in response to a 
perceived emergency, no amnesty may preclude investigation and prosecution of those responsible for offenses that 
violate non-derogable rights -- including freedom from torture, forced disappearances, and extrajudicial 
executions”). 
80 See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 1 (Feb. 14) (there are no exceptions to 
immunity from criminal inviolability when the alleged crime are crimes against humanity); Prosecutor v. 
Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1, Decision, Dec. 10, 1998, ¶ 155 (Appeals Chamber, ICTY) (holding that states can 
not use the legislative process to absolve perpetrators of torture through an amnesty law because torture is a 
peremptory norm of international law.); Union Progresista de Fiscales de Espana et al. v. Pinochet, Audiencia 
Nacional, Nov. 5, 1998 (Spain), at http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/chile/juicio/audi.html (amnesty laws can not be 
enforced against jus cogens crime); General Comment No. 20 on Article 7, U.N. Human Rights Committee, 44th 
Sess., U.N. Doc. HRI\GEN\1\Rev.1 (1994) (“The Committee has noted that some States have granted amnesty in 
respect of acts of torture. Amnesties are generally incompatible with the duty of States to investigate such acts; to 
guarantee freedom from such acts within their jurisdiction; and to ensure that they do not occur in the future. States 
may not deprive individuals of the right to an effective remedy, including compensation and such full rehabilitation 
as may be possible”). 
81 See Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (D.R.C. v. Rwanda), 2006 I.C.J. 
126 (Feb. 3) at ¶ 60  (jus cogens obligations create obligations erga omnes.); Barcelona Traction, Light and Power 
Co. Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5) at ¶ 42 (holding that obligations erga omnes are binding on all States 
and opposable against any State).    
82 Nuremburg International Military Tribunal: Judgment and Sentence, 41 A.J.I.L. 172, 221 (1947) 
(“individuals have international duties which transcend the national obligations of obedience imposed by the 
individual State”). 
83 See  Scharf, International Crimes in Haiti, supra note 77, at 12 (“impunity breeds contempt for the law 
and encourages future violations.”).  As Scharf also notes the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and its 
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities as well as fact-finding missions to 
Chile and El Salvador “impunity is one of the main reasons for the continuation of grave violations of human rights 
throughout the world…[and] led to an increase in abuses in those countries.”  See id; United Nations Commission on 
Human Rights: Report on the Consequences of Impunity, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/13; United Nations, General 
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democracy and peace, they create the long-term problem of encouraging dictators by removing 
the deterrent effect of retribution.84 The failure to prosecute also prevents victims and witnesses 
from reconciling their feelings with the past by perpetuating a sense of injustice.85 Victims may 
feel that even the emerging political institution has cheated them out of justice and thus continue 
to harbor emotions and feelings antithetical to the goals of transition.86 Thus, the feeling of 
discontent may eventually re-create the type of discord and anger which fueled the initial 
conflict.87 
II. PAST TRIBUNAL EXPERIENCES 
 
In confronting the problems for transitional justice left by prolonged conflict or, 
widespread violence, the experience of the two ad hoc tribunals in Rwanda and Yugoslavia 
illustrate the need to balance retributive and restorative considerations.  The 1994 Rwandan 
genocide left approximately one million people dead.88 It is estimated that tens of thousands of 
 
Assembly, Report of the Economic and Social Council, U.N. Doc. A/38/385 at 146 (1983).  Following the amnesty 
agreement with Turkish officials, Adolf Hitler was recorded for justifying the invasion of Poland partly on the idea 
that human tradegies in the past have often been neglected by emphatically stating “Who now remembers the 
Armenians?.”  See Bassiouni, Combating Impunity, supra note 31 at 414. 
84 Scharf, International Crimes in Haiti, supra note 77, at 39 (“Instead…Haitian amnesty is likely to serve 
as a beacon of hope for those accused of some of history's most shocking atrocities in Bosnia, Iraq, and Cambodia. 
In other parts of the globe, future dictators will be encouraged by the Haitian amnesty to commit new atrocities with 
impunity.”)  
85 In the cases cited above, the passage of amnesty laws were met with massive popular protests calling for 
the overture of such laws.  See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 79, at 458-62. 
86 The International Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia’s failure to prosecute a number of key figures to the 
Yugoslav civil war, including President Slobodan Milosevic, has led much of the affected population in a sense of 
injustice.  See Michael P. Scharf, The Tools for Enforcing International Criminal Justice in the New Millennium: 
Lessons from the Yugoslavia Tribunal, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 925, 977 (2000); see also Paul H. Robinson, The Virtues 
of Restorative Processes, the Vices of “Restorative Justice,” 2003 UTAH L. REV. 375, 380 (2003). 
87 See Neil Vidmar, Retribution and Revenge, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN LAW 43, 47-49, 56 
(Joseph Sandars & V. Lee Hamilton eds., 2000) (providing studies which conclude that non-punishment of an 
offender is likely to promote aggression toward others.)  
88 Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda submitted by Mr. R. Degni-Segui, Special 
Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, under paragraph 20 of Commission Resolution E/CN.4/S-3/1 of 




people participated in the genocide.89 The conflict in the former Yugoslavia left almost 200,000 
Muslims dead90 and created approximately 2 million refugees.91 It is also estimated that 
hundreds of thousands of civilians and soldiers were responsible for Milosevic’s campaign of 
ethnic cleansing in Yugoslavia.92 
Following the conflicts in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, the United Nations (UN), 
under the Security Council’s Article VII powers to “maintain or restore international peace and 
security”,93 created two international tribunals to prosecute persons most responsible in the 
Rwandan and Yugoslav conflicts.94 In establishing two special tribunals, the Security Council 
was “convinced that … the prosecution of persons responsible for such acts and violations … 
would contribute to the process of national reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance 
of peace.”95 The two ad hoc tribunals, the International Criminal Tribunal of former Yugoslavia 
and the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda, were ostensibly modeled after the 
Nuremburg and Tokyo military courts created following World War II.96 
89 The number of people who participated in Rwanda’s genocide is debatable.  Some studies have even held 
that approximately 200,000 people were directly or indirectly involved in the genocide in some way.  See Scott 
Straus, How many perpetrators were there in the Rwandan genocide? An estimate, 6 J. OF GENOCIDE RESEARCH 85 
(2004). 
90 Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35, The fall of Srebrenica, 
UN SECRETARY-GENERAL, G.A. 54th Session, at 8, U.N. Doc. A/54/549, (1999).  
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Can. T.S. 1945 No. 7, at art. 39. 
94 See U.N. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/Res. 827 (1993) (establishing the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Former Yugoslavia); U.N. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 3453d mtg. (1994) (establishing the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda) 
95 UN document S/RES/955 of 8 November 1994; see also Report of the International Tribunal for the 
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the 
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., at 12, U.N. Doc. A/49/342 (1994) where 
ICTY President, Antonio Cassese specifically stated that “the Yugoslav Tribunal is a tool for promoting 
reconciliation.” 
96 See RUTI TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 31-39 (2001). 
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Both ad hoc tribunals were designed to only meet the retributive needs of prosecution and 
punishment, rather then restoration and retribution.97 Reconciliation, was more of a secondary 
purpose intended to be an indirect result of the tribunal.98 The ICTR and ICTY only aimed to 
provide reconciliation by giving victims a sense of justice that the main perpetrators of the 
crimes would be punished.99 
Since the ICTY and ICTR functioned under the belief that prosecution was a foundation 
for reconciliation, witnesses and victims did not play a major role in trial proceedings.100 While 
both ad hoc tribunals provide extensive laws on the protection of witnesses and victims,101 
neither the ICTY and ICTR provided the right of victims to be represented and heard during 
criminal proceedings.102 That exclusion has since fueled severe criticism by the international 
community as to the effectiveness of both institutions in providing for post-conflict 
 
97 ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 376-87 (2003) (stating that the ad hoc tribunals 
mirrored the Nuremburg and Tokyo proceedings which sought to punish offenders rather then reconcile 
communities). 
98 See id. at 6.  Jaya Ramji similarly notes, international trials are intended to deter future crimes and 
provide retribution for victims. However, reconstruction, rehabilitation, and reconciliation are ancillary effects 
which may indirectly result.  Alternatively, many scholars also argue that there is a duty to prosecute human rights 
offenders, regardless of how it effects political and social transition. Jaya Ramji, Reclaiming Cambodian History: 
The Case for a Truth Commission, 24 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 137 (2000).  See also M. Cherif Bassiouni, 
Accountability for Violations of International Humanitarian Law and Other Serious Violations of Human Rights, in 
POST CONFLICT JUSTICE 3, 26 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2002); Orentlicher, supra note 79, at 2548. 
99 As the first President of the ICTY, Antonio Cassese, explained “Far from being a vehicle for revenge,” 
the ICTY individualizes guilt by prosecuting leaders that bear collective responsibility thus making the “Yugoslav 
Tribunal is a tool for promoting reconciliation.”  Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former 
Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., at 12, U.N. Doc. A/49/342 (1994). 
100 See  Press Release, Security Council Meets To Discuss International Tribunals for Former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda (Nov. 21, 2000), U.N. Doc. SC/6956, available at 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20001121.sc6956.doc.html (last accessed Mar. 23, 2006).    
101 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, art. 22, annexed to Report of the 
Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of U.N. Security Council Resolution 808, U.N. GAOR, May 19, 1993, 
U.N. Doc. S/25704, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159, 1193-97 [hereinafter ICTY Statute];  Statute of the International 
Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 21, adopted at New York, Nov. 8, 1994, S.C. Res. 955, U.N.SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d 
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1598; BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra 
note 20, at 649-52 (detailing the rules and procedures in the ICTY and ICTR relating to victim and witness 
protection).  
102 See Press Release, supra note 100; RICHARD MAY & MARIEKE WIERDA, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
EVIDENCE 14 (2002). 
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reconciliation.103 Most affected populations feel disconnected from international tribunal 
proceedings and judgments, as the courts do not publish individualized accounts of victims’ 
suffering.104 The ad hoc tribunals instead focus only on facts relevant to the charges against the 
respective defendants, leaving victims and witnesses feeling neglected and undermined.105 
Subsequently, one commentator was left to note that “international and foreign tribunals are far 
less likely to promote reconciliation insofar as the trials are not of and do not speak directly to 
the troubled society.”106 
a. Alternatives to the ad hoc tribunals 
 
For a country to transform into a state of increased prosperity and stability, the past 
conflicts must be reconciled between the two sides.  Without reconciliation, deeply divided 
sectors of society will not shed their tensions.  Therefore, restorative mechanisms are one way 
that victims can find a sense of justice.  Without specific mechanisms that listen to individual 
grievances of victims, victims can feel left out of the peace process and further alienated.  
The ICTY and ICTR failed to incorporate provisions that would enable victims to appear 
before the ad hoc tribunals or to claim compensation.  The prevalence of the adversarial model 
on international legal institutions107 has not boded well for the involvement of witnesses and 
victims.  As a result, various “alternative” adjudicatory models have recently emerged to address 
 
103 See Neil Kritz, Progress and Humility: The Ongoing Search for Post-Conflict Justice, in POST 
CONFLICT JUSTICE 59 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2002). 
104 See The Human Rights Center and the International Human Rights Law Clinic, University of California, 
Berkeley, & the Centre for Human Rights, University of Sarajevo, Justice, Accountability, and Social 
Reconstruction: An Interview Study of Bosnian Judges and Prosecutors, 18 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 102, 144-47 
(2000). 
105 See Michael P. Scharf & Paul R. Williams, “The Role of Justice in Building Peace”: The Functions of 
Justice and Anti-Justice in the Peace-Building Process, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 161, 175 (2003).  
106 Sarkin & Daly, supra note 27, at 718; see also Todd Howland & William Calathes, The International 
Criminal Tribunal, Is It Justice or Jingoism for Rwanda? A Call for Transformation, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 135 (1998). 
107 While there are elements of the inquisitorial model incorporated into the international criminal courts, 
the defining structures, institutions, and guiding theories for the ad hoc tribunal are highly adversarial. See CASSESE,
supra note 97, at 376-87. 
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widespread crimes.  These “alternative” models have either sought to completely incorporate 
restorative theories of justice, or balance them with retributive notions.  As one former justice of 
the ICTY notes, “[the modern trend] is the forceful emergence of individuals on the international 
level, either as the authors of international crimes or of gross and large-scale breaches of human 
rights, or as the victims of those crimes and breaches.”108 Through this process, an individual 
history is developed and recorded; rather than a collective generalization of events that 
international courts often create through retributive mechanisms of justice.  Where accounts are 
accurate and comprehensive, victims and witnesses feel that their victimization has been 
acknowledged. 109 Through acknowledgement of their injuries, the victims are often more 
capable of recovering from their injuries in order to lead more productive lives in society.110 
In response to the ICTR and ICTY’s apparent failure to individualize victim 
participation, separate institutions have been created in Rwanda and former Yugoslavia in 
attempts to “bridge the gap” between individual perpetrators, victims, and witnesses and the 
adjudicatory process.  As will be seen, the success, or failure, of these supplemental models 
hinges on how broad and expansive communal participation is.   
 
108 CASSESE, supra note 97, at 450. 
109 See Sven Alkalaj, in THE SUNFLOWER 101, 103 (Henry J. Cargas & Bonny V. Fetterman eds., 1997); 
Michael P. Scharf & Nigel Rodley, International Law Principles on Accountability, in POST CONFLICT JUSTICE 90 
(M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2002). 
110 Many have argued that retributive mechanisms are dominated by judges and lawyers and neglect the 
individualized history of victims and witnesses.  Therefore, instead of contributing to reconciliation by compiling a 
history of abuse, the tribunals could contribute to greater resentment and a sense of injustice by neglecting 
individual experiences.  See Erin Daly, Transformative Justice: Charting a Path to Reconciliation, 12 INT’L LEGAL 
PERSP. 73, 103 (2002); Donald W. Shriver, Truth Commissions and Judicial Trials: Complementary or Antagonistic 
Servants of Public Justice?, 16 J.L. & RELIGION 1, 8-9 (2001).  
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i. The Rwandan supplement: The use of Gacaca courts in Rwanda 
 
In 2000, the Rwandan government approved legislation to complement the ICTR and 
domestic criminal proceedings with state-run Gacaca courts.111 The courts were set up in 
response to the severe strains faced by Rwanda’s judicial and prison systems in housing and 
prosecuting thousands of accused perpetrators.112 Gacaca courts are community-based systems 
of dispute resolution with pre-colonial roots.113 Over hundred of thousands of civilians are 
utilized as judges and witnesses to process thousands of accused.114 While the majority of judges 
and witnesses have no formal legal training, the Gacaca courts are based on traditional dispute 
mechanisms familiar to most Rwandan communities.115 In Gacaca courts, offenders are required 
to recount their wrongdoing in the presence of their victims and other affected parties.116 The 
victim is also given the right to challenge the perpetrator’s story and in some circumstances can 
receive monetary compensation.117 By bringing the two parties together, the offender is required 
 
111 See Loi Organique No. 40/2000 du 26/01/2001 Portant Creation des ‘Jurisdictions Gacaca’ et 
Organisation des Pousuites des Infractions Constitutives du Crime de Genocide ou de Crimes contra L'Humanite, 
Commises enter le 1 Octobre 1990 et Le 31 Decembre (French text), available at http://www.minijust.gov.rw (last 
visited Mar. 20, 2006). 
112 As Carroll notes, “If the Rwandan courts continued at their current pace, it would take 150 years to try 
all the accused.”  Christina M. Carroll, An Assessment of the Role and Effectiveness of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda and the Rwandan National Justice System in Dealing with the Mass Atrocities of 1994, 18 
B.U. INT'L L.J. 163, 190 (2000). 
113 See generally Maya Goldstein-Bolocan, Rwandan Gacaca: An Experiment in Transitional Justice, 2004 
J. DISP. RESOL. 355 (2004); Erin Daly, Between Punitive and Reconstructive Justice: The Gacaca Courts in 
Rwanda, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 355 (2002); Jessica Raper, The Gacaca Experiment: Rwanda's Restorative 
Dispute Resolution Response To The 1994 Genocide, 5 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 1 (2005); Jeremy Sarkin, The 
Tension Between Justice and Reconcilliation in Rwanda: Politics, Human Rights, Due Process and the Role of the 
Gacaca Courts in Dealing with the Genocide, 45 J. AFR. LAW 143 (2001); L. Danielle Tully, Note, Human Rights 
Compliance and the Gacaca Jurisdictions in Rwanda, 26 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 385 (2003); Leach Werchick, 
Prospects for Justice in Rwanda's Citizen Tribunals, 8 HUM. RTS. BR. 15 (2001); Aneta Wierzynska, Note, 
Consolidating Democracy Through Transitional Justice: Rwanda's Gacaca Courts, 79 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1934 (2004).  
114 Sarkin, supra note 114 at 159, 162.   
115 Daly, supra note 114 at  356 (“These tribunals are derived from traditional Rwandan community courts, 
in which the elders would sit on the grass - gacaca is the Kinyarwandan word for grass - and resolve community 
conflicts”). 
116 Loi Organique No. 40/2000 du 26/01/2001, supra note 112, arts. 72-73 
117 Stef Vandeginste, Victims of Genocide, Crimes against Humanity, and War Crimes in Rwanda: The 
Legal and Institutional Framework of Their Right to Reparation, in POLITICS AND THE PAST 249, 258, 263 (John 
Torpey ed., 2003) (detailing the compensatory framework for victims under the Gacaca law). 
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to seek forgiveness.118 In turn, the offender can reduce their sentencing by half by pleading 
guilty and confessing fully.119 
The Gacaca process integrates different sectors of society by mediating disputes between 
members of the community within their community.  Rather then segregate victims and 
witnesses from the trial, the Gacaca process does exactly the opposite.  In fact, it allows the 
community, in its entirety, to participate in the trials.  Gacaca courts also allow the victim to hear 
the confession first-hand.  Local NGOs work closely with the Gacaca courts to ensure that more 
Rwandans participate and that the rights of citizens rights are protected.   
However, as a result of their non-judicial nature and informal structure, Gacaca courts 
have come under intense criticism for their lack of due process of law.120 Because Gacaca courts 
are not purely restorative mechanisms, but allow for the courts to punish perpetrators, standards 
of due process are needed to vitiate the defendant’s legitimately guaranteed rights.  Nevertheless, 
despite these criticisms, the Gacaca courts demonstrate the essential need to mix restorative and 
retributive theories of justice.  While the ICTR solely addressed retributive needs, albeit under 
the theory that retribution leads to reconciliation, the Gacaca courts have to date filled in the void 
needed for community development and peaceful integration.121 
118 Pernille Ironside, Rwandan Gacaca: Seeking Alternative Means to Justice, Peace and Reconciliation, 15 
N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 31, 49 (2002). 
119 Loi Organique No. 40/2000 du 26/01/2001, supra note 112, at arts. 68-71. 
120 See Werchick, supra note 113, at 16-28 (outlining how the Gacaca courts violate a number of due 
process rights guaranteed under international law); Sarkin, supra note 113, at 147, 164-66; Goldstein-Bolocan, 
supra note 113, at 385.  
121 See Goldstein-Bolocan, supra note 113, at 380.   
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ii. The failure of restorative mechanisms in the Yugoslav context  
 
In over 13 years, the ICTY has prosecuted a relatively few number of people122 and has 
generally been discredited amongst the concerned populations.123 Milosevic’s death has created 
even greater disapproval by affected populations on the ICTY’s perceived failure to provide 
post-conflict justice.  This failure is justified in part on the general perception that ICTY 
proceedings take a considerable amount of time without providing much perspective on the 
victims as opposed to the accused.124 Regardless of how impartial and accurate the ICTYs 
findings are, its failure to establish credibility has affected its ability to develop consensus and 
reconciliation amongst the concerned group and thus risks perpetuating the same stigmas, 
divergences, and conflicts that created the initial aggressions to begin with.  In order to combat 
these perceived inadequacies, Serbia and Montenegro (the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) 
established the Yugoslav Truth and Reconciliation Commission (YTRC)125 in 2001 to 
compensate for the ICTY’s perceived bias and ineffectiveness. The YTRC was eventually 
dissolved within two years without accomplishing much, if any, of its mandate.126 
122 ICTY Fact Sheet on ICTY Proceedings, available at http://www.un.org/icty/glance/procfact-e.htm (last 
visited Mar. 18, 2006) (as of October 17, 2003 only 41 persons has been tried and 41 others were currently in 
proceedings). 
123 A survey conducted in January and Febuary 2002, revealed that trust and approval of the ICTY was 
roughly around 51% in the Bosnian Federation, 24% in Montenegro, 21% in Croatia, 6% in Serbia, and 4% in the 
Republika Srpska.  The same study showed that trust was relatively high in Kosovo (83%).  International IDEA, 
“South East Europe Public Agenda Survey” (2002), available at www.idea.int/press/pr20020404.htm (last visited 
Mar. 18, 2006); see also Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future 
Atrocities?, 95 A.J.I.L. 7, 16-17 (2001) (describing general Serbian disapproval of the ICTY); Jelena Pejic, Legal 
Perspectives and Analyses the Yugoslav Truth and Reconciliation Commission: A Shaky Start, 25 FORDHAM INT’L
L.J. 1, 3-4 (2001) (noting the general perception by many Serbians do not believe the ICTY is very credible); The 
Human Rights Center and the International Human Rights Law Clinic, supra note 104, at 136-40.   
124 Stephen Castle, He mocked the court and made the world forget those who suffered, THE INDEPENDENT,
Mar. 12, 2006, at p. 45  (“By the way he conducted himself, Milosevic succeeded in one of his objectives. For most 
of the time the focus of attention was on him, not his victims”).   
125 Decision on the Establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Official Gazette of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, No. 15/2001 (Mar. 30, 2001) [hereinafter Decision on Establishment]. 
126 Very little academic work within the legal community has actually been done on the YTRC’s failures, 
although it is worth noting that the majority of journalists and insiders have categorically found that the YTRC was 
overall ineffective in achieving any form of significance.  See Dejan Ilic, The Yugoslav truth and reconciliation 
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The YTCR failed to meet its objectives for a number of reasons.  First, the YTCR’s 
limited mandate only concerned the causes of war127 and was inadequately funded.128 Instead of 
determining who committed heinous crimes and who did not, the YTCR mandate required it to 
draw a historical account of the causes of the Yugoslav civil wars.  However, the purposes of 
truth and reconciliation are not so much about historical causes of wars as they are an account of 
the atrocities committing during the conflict.129 To that extent, the YTCR failed to provide one 
of the basic objectives of restoration, which is recognition of the crimes committed.130 
Moreover, the fundamental purpose of the YTCR was significantly weakened by its own 
apparent bias.131 The YTCR was not designed to represent the various ethnic groups that were 
affected by the Yugoslav conflict.  Rather it was composed purely of Serbians, in Serbia, by the 
Serbian president.  Thus, its perceived subjectivity greatly inhibits its receptivity amongst the 
affected populations.     
 
commission: Overcoming cognitive blocks, EUROZINE, Apr. 4, 2004, available at 
http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2004-04-23-ilic-en.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2006). 
127 According to its mandate the YTRC’s purpose was to: a) organize research work on the uncovering of 
evidence on the social, inter-ethnic and political conflicts which led to the war and to shed light on the causal links 
among these events; b) to inform the domestic and international public about its work and results, and c) to achieve 
cooperation with  similar commissions and bodies in neighboring countries and abroad with the aim of exchanging 
experiences.  Decision on Establishment, supra note 126; see also Pejic, supra note 123, at 9-13. 
128 See International Center for Transitional Justice, Serbia and Montenegro: Selected Developments in 
Transitional Justice, Oct. 2004, at p. 8, available at http://www.ictj.org/downloads/ICTJ_Serbia.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 17, 2006) [hereinafter ICTJ Report] (“Commissioners received no salaries and none was able to work on a full-
time basis. Moreover, there was insufficient funding to hire a full professional staff or carry out any serious research, 
let alone conduct any on-site investigations”). 
129 See Amnesty Act, supra note 63 (stating the purpose of TRCs is to complete an historical picture of 
crimes perpetrated during the conflict). 
130 Following his appointment as a commissioner to the YTRC, Vojin Dimitrijevic and Latinka Perovic 
submitted their resignation because of the commission’s limited mandate.  In particular, Dimitrijevic stated:  “There 
are many reasons and causes of wars, but there is only one international humanitarian law that ought to be respected 
by both aggressors and defenders, being a lawyer…I am mostly interested, as it is to be expected, in brutalities of 
our wars.  I am afraid of big truths and explanations: in the name of these truths severe violence was done.  The 
reconciliation might start with more modest aims and goals.  It is not the matter of who was right and who was 
wrong, but who behaved as a human being and who did not.” See Ilic, supra note 126.  
131 See Pejic, supra note 123, at 12 (“ It is difficult to imagine how a Commission based in one of the five 
countries that came out of the SFRY's collapse can hope to objectively assess - and present the "truth" - on events 
about which each of the five States continue to have differing views”).  
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Second, the YTCR was established without public consultation or debate.132 The Gacaca 
courts, by comparison, were only formulated after significant community and public 
involvement.  By not engaging NGOs and victims before and during the YTRC’s operation, the 
Commission lacked credibility.133 It failed in the fundamental role of incorporating the 
community into its developmental and reconciliatory process.  Without the support of NGOs and 
civil society, the YTRC was unable to reach out to victims and witnesses.  The Gacaca courts 
and the International Criminal Court (ICC) depend on NGOs to communicate between and 
integrate victims and witnesses.  Lastly, the YTRC was handicapped by a mandate that provided 
no investigative powers and strict three-year time period.134 Without the support of civil society 
and such operational limitation, the YTRC was rendered irrelevant to witnesses, victims and 
perpetrators alike. 
While the ICTY has received extensive criticism for failing to prosecute many of the 
conflicts top leaders,135 equally important is the failure on part of legislatures in affected 
communities to develop legitimate restorative mechanisms.  The YTCR provides important 
lessons as to the importance of participation, credibility, and state support in promoting 
restorative mechanisms.  The development of a TRC is insufficient by itself.  Rather, the relevant 
components for restorative justice are the incorporation of victims and witnesses, the 
participation of civil society, and direct address of human rights abuses committed during the 
 
132 See ICTJ Report, supra note 128, at 7.   
133 See id. (“The more damaging claim, however, was that the Commission was just a weak attempt to 
placate the U.S. and the international community, which had been pushing Kostunica to address the legacy of the 
Milosevic era.  The fact that the TRC was established on the eve of a U.S. certification decision only reinforced this 
perception”).  
134 Maryann Bird and Sue Cullinan, Serbia Commission Falters, TIME, Apr. 30, 2001, at p. 16 
135 Scharf, Lessons from the Yugoslavia Tribunal, supra note 87, at 977 (nothing how the ICTY’s failure to 
apprehend and prosecute many of the Yugoslav conflicts leaders has significantly affected its credibility). 
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course of the conflict.136 Without these elements, any restorative mechanisms are meaningless in 
effectuating reconciliation and rehabilitation.     
 
b. Current trends to mix restorative and retributive models 
 
In response to Rwandan and Yugoslavian experiences, the legal experts behind the Rome 
Statute to the International Criminal Court and the Special Court for Sierra Leone included 
extensive measures to ensure the participation and protection of victims and witnesses.  The 
Rome Statute allows victims to participate in pre-trial procedural hearings137 and submit 
observations to the Court’s jurisdiction or admissibility of the case.138 This effectively allows 
victims to share their personal perspective and history with the ICC.  The Prosecutor is required 
to take into consideration the interests of the victims when determining whether to initiate an 
investigation139 and in prosecuting crimes.140 Similarly, the Trial Court may allow 
representatives of the victim to present their views where their interests are concerned.141 As 
such, victims may question witnesses,142 make opening and closing statements,143 and obtain 
financial assistance for legal representation.144 Lastly, the ICC has the power to order 
reparations for the victims including restitution, compensation by the convicted person, and 
rehabilitation,145 and allow victims to appeal reparation decisions by representation.146 
136 See ICTJ Report, supra note 128, at 8-9.   
137 Rome Statute, supra note 7, at art. 15(3).   
138 Id. at art. 19(3).   
139 Id. at arts. 53(1)(c); 53(2)(c).  
140 Id. at art. 54(1)(b).   
141 Id. at art. 68(3).  
142 International Criminal Court, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.1 
(2000) [hereinafter ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence], at R. 91(3). 
143 Id. at R. 89. 
144 Id. at R. 90(5), R. 92. 
145 Rome Statute, supra note 7, at arts. 75, 79. 
146 Id. at art. 82(4).  
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Recognizing the importance of restorative mechanisms, the Lome Peace Agreement 
between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, 
required the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to work in conjunction 
with the Special Court.147 While the Special Court is responsible for prosecuting persons most 
responsible for heinous crimes committed during the civil war, the TRC is separately responsible 
for creating “an impartial historical record of violations and abuses of human rights and 
international humanitarian law . . . , to address impunity, to respond to the needs of the victims, 
to promote healing and reconciliation and to prevent a repetition of the violations and abuses 
suffered.”148 
The experiences of the ICTR, ICTY, ICC and Special Court for Sierra Leone indicate 
modern trends to incorporate restoration and retribution either through the creation of separate 
institution, or their merger into one criminal process.  While there is no single methodology to 
incorporate restoration and retribution, it is clear that both elements must be balanced for 
transitional justice.  How the KRT effectively incorporates these models, therefore, is 
fundamental to the question of justice in Cambodia.  
 
III. CONCERNS FOR THE CURRENT KHMER ROUGE TRIBUNAL MODEL 
 
Recognizing the importance of witnesses and victims to the process of reconciliation, 
both the Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers (“EC Law”) and the 
agreement between the United Nations and Cambodia have explicit provisions requiring the 
 
147 See Peace Agreement, July 7, 1999, Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone-Revolutionary United 
Front of Sierra Leone (1999), available at http://www.usip.org/library/pa/sl/sierraleone07071999.html (last visited 
Mar. 4, 2006). 
148 Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act, art. 6(1), available at http://www.sierra-
leone.org/trcact2000.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2006). 
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KRT “to provide for the protection of victims and witnesses.149 However, existing legislation 
inside Cambodia makes it ambiguous, at best, as to the degree of victim and witnesses 
participation and protection proffered by the KRT or the Cambodian government.  While it is 
reasonably likely that the KRT itself will read into its provisions a more substantiated roles for 
victims and witnesses, a number of institutional problems currently facing the KRT make it less 
reasonable that it will “produce anything but a few symbolic trials, if any.”150 Thus, the true 
strength of the KRT will not be found in its prosecutorial power, for it is clear that the majority 
of the Khmer Rouge leadership will not be tried, but rather in its role in creating an authoritative 
history of the Khmer Rouge period.151 
The critical nature of victim and witnesses participation in the KRT is greater enhanced 
by a number of observations concerning the number of leaders tried, the lack of alternative 
mechanisms, and public perception of the KRT’s role and functions.  
 
a. Limited number of leaders to be tried 
 
Article 1 of the EC Law allows the KRT only to exercise personal jurisdiction over the 
most “senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those who were most responsible for the 
crimes and serious violations” committed during the Khmer Rouge period.152 Thus, mid to low-
level officials cannot be tried under EC Law.  However, most of the former Khmer Rouge senior 
leaders have either died or have been granted amnesty from prosecution.  Only two former 
 
149 EC Law, supra note 6, at art. 33; Cambodia-UN Agreement, supra note , at art. 23. 
150 BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 20, at 552.  
151 See Ramji, supra note 98, at 137 (“In order for Cambodian society to heal, the full truth about the 
Khmer Rouge regime must be examined and disseminated, creating a history that Cambodians can teach to their 
children”). 
152 EC Law, supra note 6, at art. 1; see also id. at art. 2 (“Extraordinary Chambers shall be established...to 
bring to trial senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those who were most responsible for the crimes” 
committed during the Khmer Rouge period).   
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Khmer Rouge officials, Kaing Khek Iev (a.k.a. Deuch)153 and Ta Mok,154 are currently in 
custody.  Other senior leaders like Ieng Sary,155 Khieu Samphan,156 and Nuon Chea157 live 
comfortable lives in Cambodia’s capitol, Phnom Penh, and provincial towns.158 Many Khmer 
Rouge leaders, including the movement’s supreme leader Pol Pot, and senior cadre, such as Son 
Sen,159 Yun Yat,160 and Ke Pauk,161 have died since the 1975-1979 genocide.  Unlike Chile’s 
stripping of Pinochet’s immunity, there is no indication that the Hun Sen government in 
Cambodia has any inclination to strip Ieng Sary or other leaders of their amnesty.    
Therefore, the KRT’s number of potential defendants is extremely limited and the vast 
majority of perpetrators will not face justice for their crimes.  The prosecution of so few leaders 
means that individual historical accounts are unlikely to be recorded into case history, thus 
restricting the creation of a comprehensive historical account of the Cambodian genocide. 
 
153 Kaing Khek Iev was the former chief of a Khmer Rouge torture center, at Toul Sleng. See Justice in the 
Killing Fields, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2001, at 18. 
154 Ta Mok, also known as the “Butcher” controlled the northern area of the Khmer Rouge territory and 
referred to himself as supreme commander.  See Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Trial for Khmer Rouge in Doubt; Discord 
Between U.N., Cambodia Imperils Possible Tribunal, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 2002, at A10. 
155 Ieng Sary was the deputy prime minister under Pol Pot and led a guerrilla war against the Cambodian 
government after the Vietnamese had pushed the Khmer Rouge out.  He was convicted in abstentia and sentenced to 
death but was later granted amnesty in 1996.  See Thomas Hammarberg, Efforts to Establish a Tribunal Against KR 
Leaders: Discussions Between the Cambodian Government and the U.N., PHNOM PENH POST, Sept. 14-17, 2002, at 
24. 
156 Khieu Samphan was the president of the Khmer Rouge but granted immunity from prosecution by the 
Hun Sen government, Cambodia's current prime minister.  See Steven Erlanger, U.S. Wants to Try Khmer Rouge 
Leaders, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1998, at A5. 
157 Nuon Chea was Pol Pot's chief lieutenant and Deputy General Secretary of the Communist Party.  Hun 
Sen similarly guaranteed Chea immunity from prosecution.  See Evan Osnos, A chilling visit with Pol Pot's 
`brother'; 27 years after Cambodia's genocide, court hopes leaders will explain terror, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 17, 2006, at 
1.   
158 See Seth Mydans, As Cambodia Prepares to Try Khmer Rouge Leaders for Massacres, They Deny 
Guilt, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2001, at A9; Matt McKinney, After Talks Break, Tribunal for Cambodia is Put in 
Doubt, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 17, 2002, at A20. 
159 Son Sen was the Khmer Rouge defense minister and Pol Pot’s right hand.  See Ben Kiernan, Obituary: 
Son Sen: Genocide's First Lieutenant, THE GUARDIAN, June 21, 1997, at 21. 
160 Yun Yat was Son Sen's wife and in charge of propaganda and education inside and outside of the 
country.  She was also responsible for eradicating Buddhism in Cambodia.  See Matthew Lee, Guerillas Accuse 
Cadres of Treason, THE AUSTRALIAN, June 12, 1997 at 6. 
161 Ke Pauk was party secretary of the northern zone and responsible for massacring hundreds of people. 
See Ben Kiernan, Ke Pauk: One of Pol Pot’s Leading Military Commanders, He was Responsible for the Murders of 
ManyThousands of Cambodians, but Escaped Justice, THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 21, 2002, at 20.   
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In addition, key perpetrators will not be held responsible because of their legal immunity 
from prosecution.  This could be severely detrimental to the KRT’s public creditability.  The 
ICTY suffered a similar fate for its failure to capture and prosecute Radovan Karad]i^ and Ratko 
Mladic and for failing to prosecute Milosevic before his death.  The lack of high profile leaders 
which could be suspect to prosecution increases the importance of victim and witnesses 
involvement.  If the KRT does not prosecute those leaders which have received immunity, the 
greater narrative of the atrocities will be lost.  To that extent, the KRT in its current form is 
unlikely to satisfactorily promote retribution.162 
b. The absence of alternative restorative mechanisms in Cambodia 
 
A number of scholars have suggested that Cambodia shoud develop its own TRC in order 
to provide victims a conduit for their past abuses.163 To date, however, no Cambodian TRC has 
been proposed or developed to record individual complaints from victims.164 It is very unlikely 
that Cambodia will construct its own TRC for a number of political and economic reasons.  First, 
the Cambodian government only agreed to the KRT after extensive political pressure was 
exerted by the international community and NGOs.  Given the less intuitive nature of restorative 
mechanisms,165 it is even less unlikely that international or domestic forces will exert enough 
political pressure necessary for the construction of an additional institution.  In fact, previous 
 
162 It is worth noting that Cambodia’s King Sihanouk officially took a stance against the KRT  because so 
few will be prosecuted.  The King does not believe that the KRT can provide justice for the people nor for his 
family, whom were killed in the Bang Trabiech camp.  It is believed that the chief of camp, Hor Nam Hong, gave 
the orders but Hong won two trials (first against Sihanouk in 1999 when a French court turned down Sihanouk’s 
accusation because no witnesses appeared at the trial in Paris, second against the Cambodia Daily as no witness 
came to the trial when called.) 
163 See generally Ramji, supra note 98, at 137; Matthew J. Soloway, Cambodia’s Response to the Khmer 
Rouge: War Crimes Tribunal vs. Truth Commission, 8 APPEAL 32 (2002). 
164 In 2002, Khieu Samphan, one of the leaders of the Khmer Rouge who continues to reside in Cambodia, 
argued that considerations for a KRT should be replaced with a truth commission.  Samphan’s demands were 
eventually rejected by the Cambodian government.  See Khmer Rouge Trial Advocates Reject Khieu Samphan’s Call 
for Truth Commission, Associated Free Press, Dec. 2, 2002 (on file with author). 
165 See supra, text accompanying note 4. 
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efforts to develop a TRC similar to the South African version were rejected by the United States 
and local advocacy groups in Cambodia.166 
Second, a TRC implicates low to mid-level officials by allowing victims to dictate crimes 
that were perpetrated against them.167 The majority of Cambodia’s political elite, including its 
powerful prime minister, Hun Sen, were former low to mid level Khmer Rouge officials.168 In 
fact, it is precisely because of their roles during the Khmer Rouge period that the Cambodian 
government has extensively restricted the number of potential defendants169 that would be 
subject to the KRT and have demanded the central role of the Cambodian judiciary.170 
Third, even if the Cambodian government were to decide to establish a TRC that would 
involve victims it would most likely be ineffective.  When the South African TRC and various 
others were established, they immediately followed the period of conflict.171 Victims, witnesses, 
and offenders had vivid images of the atrocities and were more willing to engage with each 
other.  A Cambodian TRC, on the other hand, would be developed almost 30 years later.  Many 
of the low to mid level Khmer Rouge officials have since moved on and integrated themselves 
deeply into society.  They have also aged or died away, much like many of the victims.  
Therefore, the construction of a TRC could actually have negative repercussions to the stability 
 
166 See Peter Alford, Hun Sen Truth Trial Rejected, THE AUSTRALIAN, Mar.5, 1999, at 10.  
167 Lisa Clausen, Slow Road to Justice, TIME, Mar 24, 2003, at 48.  See also MICHAEL HUMPHREY, THE 
POLITICS OF ATROCITY AND RECONCILIATION, FROM TERROR TO TRAUMA 106 (2002). 
168 Id. 
169 Id.
170 Interestingly, the majority, if not all, of judges proposed by the Cambodian government for the KRT are 
also on the Ministry of Justice’s list of “corrupt officials.”  The government’s recommendation of these officials 
certainly indicates its perspectives on the process, but also its interest in maintaining significant control over the 
judgments and opinions likely to be issued.    
171 See Education Reform will Ensure Cambodian Students Learn about Khmer Rouge Regime, Morning 
Edition (National Public Radio, Nov. 16, 2004) (transcript on file with author). 
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of Cambodian life by re-creating the perpetrator/victim relationship within Cambodian 
society.172 
Lastly, the KRT has suffered from insufficient financial support and the government’s 
reluctance to provide the necessary funds for its development.173 Given the abovementioned 
political reasons, it is far less likely that either the international community or the Cambodian 
government will allocate funds toward the creation of a Cambodian TRC or for the purposes of 
community development.  
 
c. Public support for the Khmer Rouge Tribunal 
 
Because of structural and procedural inadequacies, most Cambodians are skeptical about 
the KRT.  While the vast majority of Cambodians still desire that high-level officials be 
prosecuted,174 Cambodians have emphasized the need for an impartial and objective tribunal, 
some Cambodians would even prefer no trial be conducted if the trial had to be sub-standard.175 
Such preferences could stem from concerns that government agents will manipulate the 
proceedings to serve their own political needs.  
Cambodians are conscious about the survival and empowerment of low-level Khmer 
Rouge agents in society.  The individuals who actually carried, planned, or directed the atrocities 
during the Khmer Rouge period were mostly low-ranking officials in remote districts.  While 
many of low-level officials received direct orders from the central Khmer Rouge leadership, 
 
172 One of Hun Sen’s main arguments in support of a Cambodian TRC was that a criminal trial could 
“panic other Khmer Rouge officers and its rank-and-file who have already surrendered, into turning back to the 
jungle and renewing guerilla war.” Peter Alford, Hun Sen truth trial rejected, THE AUSTRALIAN, Mar.5, 1999, at 10.    
173 See Amy Kazmin, Cambodians Called on to Fund Khmer Rouge Tribunal, June 7, 2005, FIN. TIMES, at 
5 (outlying funding problems facing the KRT) 
174 Khmer Institute for Democracy, Survey on the Khmer Rouge Regime and the Khmer Rouge Tribunal,
2004, at 12, available at http://www.bigpond.com.kh/users/kid/KRG-Tribunal.htm [hereafter KID Survey] (96.8% 
of persons surveyed expressed wanted perpetrators to be brought to trial.)  
175 Id. at 13 (44.1% of persons interviewed held that they would prefer no trial as compared to a sub-
standard trial).  
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numerous murders were also committed purely without order.  As such, there are significant 
grievances by Cambodians that even low-level officials be prosecuted in some way.176 
There is a common misconception by Cambodians that the KRT will prosecute all 
persons responsible for crimes committed under the Khmer Rouge, including low-level agents.177 
Most Cambodians see the top three people to be tried as being Ieng Sary, Khieu Samphan, and 
Ta Mok.  Given that Ieng Sary and Samphan were granted immunity from prosecution, even if 
Ta Mok and a few others are prosecuted and convicted, then the majority of Cambodians 
probably still will not feel that justice has been delivered.  Assuming the KRT does not adjust its 
mandate and only prosecutes 5-7 individuals within the Khmer Rouge leadership, victims and 
witnesses to the genocide will suffer the loss of law and justice.     
 
d. Involvement of Victims and Witnesses 
 
The participation of victims and witnesses is an indispensable aspect of transitional 
justice.  As noted above, the experiences of the ICTR and ICTY have demonstrated that 
prosecution without the direct involvement and participation of witnesses and victims severely 
affects the credibility of the courts and by extension their effectiveness.  The non-participation of 
witnesses not only impact the credibility of trials, but also the effectiveness of the prosecution.178 
A number of aspects affect the involvement of victims and witnesses: the existence of restorative 
mechanisms, extensive participatory rights before the criminal court or tribunal, and protection 
from physical and psychological harm.    
 
i. Insufficient Participatory Rights for Victims under the EC Law 
 
176 Id. at 14. 
177 Id.
178 Rape cases before the ICTY and ICTR have been inhibited by the non-participation of witnesses.  See 
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion Requesting Protective Measures for 
Victims and Witnesses, Aug. 10, 1995 (Appeals Chamber, ICTY).   
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While the EC Law has no provisions creating a separate “truth telling” institution, there 
are a number of provisions which could provide victims the right to become parties in KRT 
trials.  Pursuant to Article 36, the EC Law allows the KRT to hear appeals filed by victims, as 
well as the accused or the co-prosecutors.179 By incorporating provisions of Cambodia’s 
domestic criminal code, the EC Law also leaves the possibility open for victims and witnesses to 
participate in the KRT.  Under the EC Law, the co-prosecutors, trial chamber and co-
investigating judges must work in accordance with “existing procedures in force.”180 
A number of provisions in Cambodia’s domestic criminal code provide for victim and 
witness participation.  First, under Cambodia’s Law on Criminal Procedure, a victim may either 
propose that the prosecutor initiate an investigation or appeal to the Supreme Court, if the 
prosecutor declines to prosecute, for prosecution.181 Victims may also join cases initiated by 
other parties as long as a final judgment has not been reached.182 Second, Cambodian criminal 
codes accord victims the same participatory rights as the defendants and prosecutor.  The 
 
179 EC Law, supra note 6, at art. 36 (“The Extraordinary Chambers of the Supreme Court shall decide 
appeals made by the accused, the victims, or the Co-Prosecutors against the decision of the Extraordinary Chamber 
of the trial court”).    
180 See EC Law, supra note 6, at art. 20 (“The Co-Prosecutors shall prosecute in accordance with existing 
procedures in force.”); EC Law, supra note 6, at art. 23 (“All investigations shall be the joint responsibility of two 
investigating judges...and shall follow existing procedures in force.”);  EC Law, supra note 6, at art. 33 (“The 
Extraordinary Chambers of the trial court shall ensure that trials are fair and expeditious and are conducted in 
accordance with existing procedures in force, with full respect for the rights of the accused and for the protection of 
victims and witnesses”).   
181 Royal Government of Cambodia, Law on Criminal Procedure [hereinafter Law on Criminal Procedure], 
Art. 10 (on file with author) (“In case when the complaint of any plaintiff, believing to be injured by an act that 
he/she thinks consisting a criminal offence and the representative of the prosecution office does not respond or file it 
without follow-up, the plaintiff may submit the case to the appellate court, Law on Criminal Procedure, supra note 
181, at art. 56  (“The prosecutor has the duty: - to receive the complaint and the denunciation related to the crime or 
the misdemeanor even though the complaint is from any person”).  
182 Law of Criminal Procedure, supra note 181, at 131 (“The injured party may always become a plaintiff 
as long as the judge has not yet issued a judgment”); Royal Government of Cambodia, Criminal Code of Cambodia 
[hereinafter Criminal Code], at art. 27 (on file with author) (“Victims or their beneficiaries may directly or through 




victim’s attorney may file appeals following final judgment by the trial chamber183 or issuance of 
pre-trial detention,184 call185 or examine witnesses,186 testify at trial,187 have access to the trial 
transcript,188 request closing statements,189 or even propose interlocutory judgments.190 
Whether or not provisions of Cambodia’s domestic code relating to victim participation 
are read into the EC Law depends significantly on the flexibility of the respective judges and 
prosecutors.  It is just as likely that the judges and prosecutors will not utilize these provisions.  
The aforementioned criminal codes relate to the victim’s ability to file companion civil claims to 
criminal cases.191 Thus, unlike US cases, both the civil and criminal damages would be awarded 
by the same court and be heard through the same judicial proceeding.  The EC Law, however, 
only provides for criminal sanctions192 and does not explicitly give rise to separate civil actions.  
If the KRT adopts a narrow interpretation of its provisions under the EC Law, it could reject 
broader participatory rights granted to victims under Cambodia’s criminal codes and only grant 
the right of appeal as guaranteed under the EC Law.193 A broader interpretation, however, 
comports more logically with EC Law’s provisions on victim participation.  It is difficult to 
understand how victims can appeal decision if they are not parties to a law suit.  To do so, would 
 
183 Law on Criminal Procedure, supra note 181, at  art. 161; Criminal Code, supra note 182, at art. 4.  
184 Law on Criminal Procedure, supra note 181, at art. 79; Criminal Code, supra note 182, at art. 14(3). 
185 Law on Criminal Procedure, supra note 181, at art. 133. 
186 Criminal Code, supra note 182, at art. 24. 
187 Law on Criminal Procedure, supra note 181, at art. 132. 
188 Law of Criminal Procedure, supra note 181, at art. 110; Criminal Code, supra note 182, at art. 27.   
189 Criminal Code, supra note 182, at art. 23. 
190 Law on Criminal Procedure, supra note 181, at art. 140. 
191 See Law on Criminal Procedure, supra note 181, at art. 2 (“Any criminal offence may give rise to two 
separate legal actions: public action and civil action.”); Law on Criminal Procedure, supra note 181, at art. 5 (“The 
civil action is for the purpose, shall receive award proportionate to the damages incurred to him/her”); Law on 
Criminal Procedure, supra note 181, at art. 9 (“The person who believes to be injured by an infraction may lodge a 
complaint along with the prosecution proceedings in order to obtain award”). 
192 EC Law, supra note 6, at art. 38 (“All penalties shall be limited to imprisonment”); EC Law, supra note 
6, at art. 39 (“In addition to imprisonment, the Extraordinary Chamber of the trial court may order the confiscation 
of personal property, money, and real property acquired unlawfully or by criminal conduct.  The confiscated 
property shall be returned to the State”)  (emphasis added). 
193 See EC Law, supra note 6, at art. 36.    
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be a serious violation of the defendant’s rights to due process.  At least in theory, therefore, 
victims have the right to participate in the KRT in the same way as they have the possibility to be 
joined in as civil parties in a criminal case in Cambodia.     
 
ii. Inadequate institutions for victim and witness protection 
 
Integral to the success of tribunals in reconciling communities is the protection of victims 
and witnesses from reprisals.194 Protection gives witnesses and victims a sense of security and 
encourages their participation in trials.  Thus, without personal security, witnesses and victims 
are more likely to disassociate with criminal proceedings.195 
The EC Law, on the other hand, fails to adequately ensure witness and victim protection.  
Article 33 of the EC Law requires the court to provide measures, which protect the security and 
confidentiality of victims and witnesses.196 However, the EC Law creates no independent 
witness protection programs, like the Victim and Witness Protection Unit in the ICC, which 
specifically help witnesses and victims.  Rather, the Cambodian witness and victim protection 
unit is staffed jointly by Cambodian officials, leaving security to Cambodian police.197 The 
failure to create an independent security unit is likely to deter witnesses from testifying.   
The Cambodian people, at large, continue to believe in the need for and power of justice 
to provide some closure for this terrible period in Cambodian history.198 However, the majority 
 
194 In its first annual report, the ICTY similarly found witnesses are generally reluctant to testify in post-
conflict society because of their negative experience with governmental institutions.  ICTY First Annual Report 
(1994), at ¶ 75, 78.   
195 See BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 20, at 649 (noting the problems inhibiting 
general witness participation in international criminal trials).   
196 EC Law, supra note 6, at art. 33 (“The Court shall provide for the protection of victims and witnesses.  
Such protection measures, shall include, but not be limited to, the conduct of in camera proceedings and the 
protection of the victim's identity”). 
197 Id. at art. 33. 
198 Surveys conducted by the Khmer Institute of Democracy (KID), Center for Social Development (CSD), 
and the Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam) revealed that the overwhelming majority of Cambodian 
citizens were victims of the Khmer Rouge regime and wanted a tribunal to prosecute their leaders.  See generally 
KID Survey, supra note 174. 
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of potential witnesses do not trust officials in the current government given that many officials, 
including top leaders, were junior members of the Khmer Rouge.199 Witnesses fear potential 
reprisals because the witness and victim protection units are composed purely of Cambodian 
police officials with direct links to government authorities.200 Witness protection units similar to 
the ICC and ICTY, on the other hand may ease some fears as they are composed of international 
observers and workers.  
Overall, common concerns and misunderstandings about the KRT are likely to fuel 
continuing discontent and feelings of injustice if victims and witnesses are not actively engaged, 
protected and integrated.  Unless the KRT is adjusted to meet Cambodian perceptions of justice 
and their concern for impunity, the tribunal will carry the stigma of politicizing the genocide 
rather than accounting for it. 
The EC Law contains provisions that would enable the trial court to integrate 
international legal standards on the protection of victims and witnesses.  The EC Law allows the 
trial courts to seek guidance “in procedural rules established at the international level” where 
there are no provisions on the topic or uncertainty.201 In the preparatory debates leading up to 
the EC Law, Deputy Prime Minister, Sok An, noted that Article 33 was specifically designed to 
give the trial chamber broad discretion in utilizing international standards and procedures when 
providing for the protection of witnesses and victims.202 
The United Nations Declaration on Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and 
Abuse of Power, establishes the most fundamental rights relating to victim protection and 
 
199 See Education Reform will Ensure Cambodian Students Learn about Khmer Rouge Regime, Morning 
Edition (National Public Radio, Nov. 16, 2004) (transcript on file with author). 
200 KID Survey, supra note 174, at 15 (Indicating that over 71.2% of persons interviewed worried that 
participation before the KRT would jeopardize their personal security).    
201 EC Law, supra note 6, at art. 33.     
202 See The First Session of the Third Term of Cambodian National Assembly, October 4-5, 2004, Debate 




participation.203 In particular, the Declaration requires that victims be treated with compassion 
and dignity,204 their views should be considered at appropriate stages of proceedings;205 victims 
should be provided with proper assistance throughout the legal process;206 measures should be 
taken to ensure their safety from intimidation and retaliation;207 and procedures should be put in 
place to ensure that victims have access to restitution,208 compensation,209 and medical, 
psychological, and social assistance.210 These principles have been re-articulated in the Basic 
Principles and Guidelines on the Rights to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross 
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law211 and incorporated in the constitutive treaties for the ICC,212 European Court 
on Human Rights,213 Inter-American Court on Human Rights,214 and African Commission on 
Human and People’s Rights.215 
In conformity with these principles, substantial measures are taken by the ICC to protect 
them, including the creation of a Victim and Witness Unit.216 The Unit is responsible for 
protecting the security and well being of victims and witnesses by providing for their protection, 
 
203 Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, G.A. 40/34, annex, 
40 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 53) at 214, U.N. Doc. A/40/53 (1985).   
204 Id. at ¶ 4.   
205 Id. at ¶ 6(b).   
206 Id. at ¶ 6(c).  
207 Id. at ¶ 6(d). 
208 Id. at ¶¶ 8-11. 
209 Id. at ¶¶ 12-13. 
210 Id. at ¶¶ 14-17. 
211 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross 
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, Apr. 19, 
2005, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/ L.10/Add.11.  
212 Rome Statute, supra note 7, at art. 68, 75.  
213 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Sept. 3, 1953, 
213 U.N.T.S. 222, at art. 13. 
214 American Convention on Human Rights, July 18, 1978, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, at art. 25. 
215 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Oct. 21, 1986, 21 I.L.M. 58, at art. 7.    
216 Rome Statute, supra note 7, at art. 43(6) (setting up the Victims and Witnesses Unit within the 
Registry); see also ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 142.  
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medical and psychological needs.217 Accordingly, the ICC can prohibit public disclosure of the 
victim or witness’s name or location.218 The ICC can also ensure that all testimony is given in 
closed sessions and that the victim or witness is given a pseudonym or that their voice or image 
is altered.219 Most importantly, the ICC relies on local and international NGOs to protect the 
confidentiality of witness’s identities and ensuring that the Court, itself, respects its own rules.220 
Similarly, both ad hoc tribunals provided extensive protections for victims and witnesses.221 In 
order to meet international standards and requirements, the KRT needs to take greater measures 




The record of accomplishment of the ICTR, ICTY, and ICC indicate that the participation 
and protection of witnesses and victims serves a fundamental, if not necessary, component for 
reconciliation.  The current model for the KRT arguably fails to adequately assure the protection 
and participation of victims and witnesses.  However, the EC Law theoretically allows judges to 
expand the scope of the KRT’s mandate by integrating international standards and provisions of 
Cambodia’s law which could expand the role and protections for victims and witnesses.  Without 
an expanded focus on restorative justice, it is unlikely that individualized accounts of 
victimization and offenses will be developed and along with it, the building blocks to 
reconciliation.  
Rather than repeating the mistakes of the past, it is important that the KRT consider the 




219 Id. at art. 69(2); R. 67.  
220 See ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 142, at R. 17(2)(v); R. 18(e).  
221 See Statute of the ICTY, supra note 101, at rule 69.  
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1. Utilize NGOs to ensure the full participation and protection of victims and witnesses in 
trials, if they wish, pursuant to Cambodian law   
2. Create additional legislative measures which guarantee the security of witnesses and 
victims before, during, and after the trial 
3. Create a separate witness and victim unit using international monitors and domestic 
police agents in order to prevent acts of reprisal. 
4. Develop a comprehensive history, which includes individual accounts of victimization. 
5. Draft legislation making it explicitly clear that victims have the right to fully 
participate in trials. 
Failure to consider these or similar measures may prevent the KRT from emerging as an 
independent judicial body that can bring justice and reconciliation to Cambodia.  An ineffective 
tribunal would only encourage the perpetrators of genocide in their belief in impunity and give 
them cause to commit further crimes.  The KRT’s success will depend on its ability to adapt to 
the need and hopes of the Cambodian people.  Without required changes promoting protection 
and integration, the KRT will serve as nothing more than a $56 million dollar institution created 
to appease the international conscious. 
